A nuclear future?

Nuclear energy growth

There is now a fixed conviction across Asia that nuclear power is a clean and relatively cost-efficient option to fill the gap between the domestic energy resources of individual countries and the uncertainties of the supply. Currently in the region there are 112 nuclear-powered reactors in operation, 37 under construction (compared to 18 in the rest of the world) and firm plans to build another 84. With the proposed expansion of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons proliferation may come to be seen as a priority concern.

Asian nations considering the nuclear option include Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. The Philippines, which built a reactor in the 1970s but was never operated commercially because of safety concerns, is having another review of the possibility. While virtually all the Pacific Rim countries have research programmes for nuclear energy (outside of New Zealand), the greatest growth in nuclear generation, however, is forecasted to be in China, Japan, South Korea and India.

Security concerns

In addition to concerns about the economics, environmental sustainability and safety of nuclear power development, the security implications in terms of weapons proliferation and terrorism remain a key anxiety. The Asian trend towards nuclear power has presented a challenge for the US, whose current administration has made strengthening the nuclear treaty’s enforcement and eradication of nuclear weapons a fundamental policy issue. On the one hand, the US welcomes the low-carbon energy source, on the other however, the government feels the security consequences of increased potential for weapons proliferation must be addressed.

Weapon development

Asia's growing enthusiasm for nuclear power is not, on the exterior, weapons-driven. However, the possibility that some countries will embark on the sensitive segments of nuclear fuel preparation and reprocessing cycle which give a country the potential to develop nuclear weapons is of chief concern. The same technology used for civilian energy purposes can be applied to military ones, although weapons-grade uranium needs to be at 90 per cent or more U-235. Proliferation of enrichment or reprocessing capability may make it easier for terrorist organisations or rogue regimes to obtain highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Moreover, the danger of more countries having their own enrichment capability is that there is then a correspondingly greater risk of more countries having a head up in the ability to pursue nuclear weapons development in the future. On weapons development, the largest regional concern is Burma, where fresh claims that the military junta has nuclear ambitions, although adamantly denied, have led to allegations that North Korea is collaborating with the regime to develop a nuclear programme.

Security gaps

Asia has looked at its growing energy demand, energy security and environmental concerns, and is seeking nuclear reactors as the most practical solution. There is no question that, at present, nuclear power will be used to fill the hole in the region’s energy supplies. A nuclear bomb, however, cannot be made without nuclear material and the most probable way to get nuclear material is for it to be stolen from an insecure stockpile. The weak security environment for these materials in many Asian countries pursuing nuclear energy, such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, leaves a great risk that terrorists could overcome it.

Recommendations

Southeast Asian nations’ spotty and uneven commitment to international agreements on nuclear security should be institutionalised to the point where enforceable rules and laws are created, rather than the typical informal consultations of the main regional entity – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A dual pronged approach to address this appears to be the only available immediate option. First, in order to benchmark adherence to global standards and ease international unease, all Asian countries should sign and ratify the key international agreements, particularly the UN Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Secondly, state-level efforts should focus around export controls, largely weak or non-existent in Southeast Asia, and all national legislation and regulations should remain open to ASEAN scrutiny.

Author: Brittany Damora, AKE Intelligence Analyst and Asia Specialist www.akegroup.com

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