A rethink of the European Union’s (EU) Arctic policy could keep Norway’s Barents Sea gas in play in the 2030s, offering Europe a nearby, low-emission supply option as its reliance on the global liquefied natural gas market grows, according to new Rystad Energy research and analysis.
The European Commission is reviewing its 2021 Arctic policy and has opened a public consultation through 16 March 2026. With Barents projects typically needing five to 10 years to move from discovery to steady output, the signal the EU sends now will determine whether additional volumes from already-open Norwegian acreage are ready for the mid-2030s, or whether Europe will lean even more heavily on global LNG in the next decade.
Rystad Energy’s analysis suggests that the EU could boost production in the Barents Sea by drawing a clearer boundary, both geographically and operationally, without necessarily weakening its climate stance. By defining the ‘Arctic’ scope more narrowly and tying any eligibility to explicit emissions and environmental requirements, the EU could avoid treating Norway’s already-open Barents acreage the same as frontier areas. The approach would still be contested among environmental groups, and it wouldn’t change the underlying trade-offs around Arctic drilling, but it could influence how buyers and policymakers weigh supply options during the 2030s. In Rystad Energy’s base case scenario for the EU27 plus the UK, Norway supplies about 20 - 30% of gas demand through 2050, with LNG rising from 30% to 50% during the same period, increasing Europe’s exposure to global markets.
The resource base is substantial, but converting it into deliverable supply is less than straightforward. The parts of the Barents Sea already open to exploration, according to Norwegian Offshore Directorate estimates, hold around 3.5 billion boe of natural gas, or about 22 trillion ft3. Rystad Energy estimates producing fields and projects expected to be sanctioned by 2030 will contribute combined output of roughly 2.25 billion boe through 2050. Additional output beyond that would likely depend on new discoveries, coordinated development across multiple fields and, crucially, export capacity.
Infrastructure is a significant swing factor and could limit long-term scalability. A 2023 study by Gassco and the Norwegian Offshore Directorate found that new Barents export capacity can be socio-economically profitable if sufficient volumes are proven. Today, the region’s main outlet is Hammerfest LNG, an export terminal in the far north, but it remains largely tied to the Snøhvit field, which limits flexibility to absorb any new volumes. A pipeline connection south into the Norwegian Sea network is one potential route, but it would require enough scale and synchronised timelines across projects to be financeable.
“Lead times in the Barents Sea are long, so clear policies matter. If the EU sets clear definitions and requires data-backed verification, it can keep near-term supply options open without blurring its climate standards,” says Tore Guldbrandsøy, Partner and Oil & Gas Analyst at Rystad Energy.
Emissions are one of the key points policymakers are considering during this review period, and this will directly impact how buyers view and compare future Barents gas supply to other sources. Norway’s upstream production is among the lowest-emitting globally, and gas delivered by pipeline from Norway generally ranks as a lower-emissions option for Europe. At Snøhvit, carbon dioxide (CO2) removed from the produced gas is already reinjected offshore, and planned electrification of the Snøhvit–Hammerfest LNG facilities is expected to cut the project’s carbon footprint further.
Environmental critics note that lower emissions intensity doesn’t change the fact that burning gas adds CO2 to the atmosphere, but methane leakage and carbon intensity are increasingly used in policy and procurement to distinguish between remaining sources of supply during the transition.
Opening the door completely is not a realistic option for the EU, but a well-structured framework with tight definitions and standards could keep sensitive northern Barents areas off-limits, while explicitly distinguishing already-open Norwegian zones from frontier areas. Any eligibility could be linked to measurable thresholds for methane and CO2 intensity, deadlines for ending routine flaring, electrification and CO2 management where feasible, and independent verification with transparent reporting.
Other environmental safeguards beyond emissions are also crucial: protection for sensitive ecosystems, seasonal operating limits, and structured consultation with Sámi, coastal communities and fisheries. Demand risk is also a factor for the bloc to consider. If EU gas consumption falls faster than expected, more frequent policy reviews could limit the risk of stranded resources, for example, by tightening eligibility or reassessing whether additional infrastructure still makes sense.
“Europe is going to be comparing marginal gas supplies more than adding large new ones. Using lifecycle emissions and methane performance as decision criteria won’t settle the broader climate debate, but it does steer remaining demand toward the lower-impact end of the barrel. A clearly defined and structured Arctic policy can help move the EU in that direction,” says Emil Varré Sandøy, Vice President for Oil & Gas Research at Rystad Energy.